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Shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the Wash-
ington Institute for Near East Policy published a
short book (137 pages) by Martin Kramer entitled
Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern
Studies in America. Kramer is the editor of the M i d d l e
East Quarterly, a journal founded by Daniel Pipes and
others who feel that the discipline of Middle Eastern
Studies, as practised in the United States, has be-
come too pro-Arab and too 'dovish'. Kramer, a former
director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East-
ern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, shares
Pipes's views, though he has generally been less stri-
dent in expressing them. Ivory Towers on Sand is pri-
marily a critique of scholars dealing with issues relat-
ed to American foreign policy in the Middle East.
Kramer is not especially troubled by current trends in
the study of Sufi poetry. 
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Both Kramer and Pipes, like their intellectual
mentor Bernard Lewis, view the Muslim
world as inherently irrational, violent, and
above all, anti-Semitic. The Arabs in particu-
lar only understand force. They will behave
only if they are beaten mercilessly. The
American government should not waste
time trying to address their alleged griev-
ances, or those of Muslims in general, be-
cause these all boil down to primitive ha-
tred of the infidel and resentment that the
infidel now dominates the believer instead
of the other way around (Lewis 1990).This
view of the Islamic world underlies the poli-
cies of the Sharon government in Israel and
the policies favoured by at least some mem-
bers of the American administration. So the
issues at stake are by no means strictly aca-
demic. 
Changes in policy
It is of course natural that Kramer and
Pipes disapprove of most American scholar-
ship on contemporary Middle Eastern poli-
tics in recent decades. American scholars,
like most of their European and Israeli col-
leagues, generally reject the notion that
brutal repression is invariably the best re-
sponse to Islamic militancy, Palestinian na-
tionalism, and the terrorism often associat-
ed with both. Most Middle East specialists in
the United States would argue that to win
the 'war on terrorism', it is necessary to di-
lute the rage that fuels it. This would entail
significant changes in American and Israeli
foreign policy. (There are many Middle East
specialists who would take issue with the
very notion of a 'war on terrorism'.)
Kramer contends that the 'paradigms' of
American Middle East experts 'have been
swept away by events' (Kramer 2001: 2). One
could say the same of the Pipes-Kramer par-
adigm. Ariel Sharon invaded Lebanon to
eliminate Palestinian terrorism by force in
1982. He is still using the same methods for
the same purpose twenty years and thou-
sands of deaths later. Yossi Sarid, the head
of Israel's Meretz party, has noted that Is-
rael's war in southern Lebanon 'killed more
than 1,000 Israeli soldiers' and 'created
Hizbollah' (Sarid 2001). Rather than elimi-
nate anti-Israeli terrorism, Israel's occupa-
tion of southern Lebanon created an entire-
ly new form of it among the Lebanese
S h ici t e s, who initially welcomed the Israelis
in 1982. Former heads of Israel's General Se-
curity Service, Shin Bet Ami Ayalon and
Carmi Gillon, have repeatedly stressed that
Palestinian terrorism is the product of de-
spair (Gillon 1999; Eldar 2001). Yet Kramer
and Pipes advocate policies that would in-
crease that despair. 
Nevertheless, no matter how mistaken
Kramer and Pipes may be in terms of the
policies they advocate, some of their criti-
cisms of Middle Eastern Studies in the Unit-
ed States are valid. Many American special-
ists on the Middle East are so determined to
rebut popular stereotypes about Islam that
they idealize all things Islamic, especially
the militant movements commonly referred
to as 'fundamentalist' or 'Islamist'. Scholars
like John Esposito do ignore or downplay
the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that
pervade the Islamist literature (Munson
1996). They do ignore or downplay the
threat that such movements pose to human
rights as well as to the possibility of resolv-
ing the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians. Moreover, while Kramer exag-
gerates the impact of Edward Said's Orien-
talism on political science (Gause 2002), it is
true that any scholar who dares to discuss
discrimination against the Baha'is in Iran,
slavery in the Sudan, or the Islamists' perse-
cution of intellectuals in Egypt runs the risk
of being called an 'Orientalist', a 'Zionist', or
an agent of American imperialism. Con-
versely, of course, anyone who dares to crit-
icize the policies of Ariel Sharon runs the risk
of being called an anti-Semite or a self-hat-
ing Jew.
The field of Middle Eastern Studies has be-
come politicized and polarized between
two forms of moral myopia represented by
Daniel Pipes on the one hand and John Es-
posito on the other. Reading Pipes, one
could easily believe that Muslim hostility to-
ward Israel is simply a matter of anti-Semi-
tism. Reading Esposito, one would never
know that anti-Semitism is indeed a serious
problem in the Islamic world. Pipes demo-
nizes Islamic militancy without analysing
the various social, nationalistic, and reli-
gious grievances that fuel it (see Pipes
1996). Esposito idealizes Islamic militancy
while downplaying the bigotry, fanaticism,
and violence associated with it (see Esposito
1999). Students of Islamic militancy need to
avoid both Pipes's demonization and Espos-
ito's idealization. 
The rage that fuels
If we take, for example, the Palestinian Is-
lamist group Hamas, we find that its charter
borrows many of the classical shibboleths of
European anti-Semitism. It contends that
'the enemies' have 'taken control of the
world media' and were 'behind the French
revolution, the communist revolution, and
most of the revolutions we have heard
about' (presumably, Iran's Islamic revolution
was an exception to the rule). The charter
goes on to say that Zionists 'created secret
organizations like the Masons, Rotary Clubs,
Lions Clubs, and the Bnai Brith throughout
the world to destroy societies and promote
Zionist interests'. These claims are followed
by the usual assertions Ð usual in the Is-
lamist literature at any rate Ð about how
Jews caused World Wars I and II to profit
from arms-dealing and 'ordered the cre-
ation of the United Nations and the Security
Council to replace the League of Nations to
rule the world through them' (Harub 1996:
298Ð99). To write about Hamas without
mentioning such rhetoric would be to pre-
sent a thoroughly sanitized and distorted
picture of the movement. 
At the same time, however, Hamas's hos-
tility toward Israel is not simply the result of
anti-Semitism. Hamas is, among other
things, a nationalistic movement seeking
liberation from what it sees as colonial rule.
Hamas's charter says its supporters are Mus-
lims who 'raised the banner of jihad in the
face of the oppressors to free the country
and the worshippers of God [a l -ci b a d] from
their pollution, filth, and evil' (Ibid.: 289). In
the minds of Hamas's supporters, the tradi-
tional dichotomy of Muslim versus Jew has
now meshed with the dichotomy of 'op-
pressed' versus 'oppressor'. 
Hamas grew out of the frustration engen-
dered by the PLO's and then the Palestinian
Authority's failures, both on the political
and social fronts. The despair and rage that
fuel Islamic militancy in the Gaza Strip have
been graphically described by Amira Hass,
who writes that 'support for the Islamic
movement is closely tied to a sense of Pales-
tinian impotence' (Hass 1999: 111). Ahmad
Q u r a ic, best-known as Abu cA l a ', was one of
the principal Palestinian negotiators of the
Oslo accords. When Israeli soldiers prevent-
ed him from travelling from Gaza to his
home on the West Bank, he reportedly de-
clared: 'Soon, I too will join Hamas' (Kape-
liouk 1996: 201). Abu cA l a ' did not really
mean this. He was simply expressing the
popular view of Hamas as the voice of Pales-
tinians fed up with life in the West Bank and
Gaza. (Palestinian Christians obviously have
to find other voices.)
In addition to expressing the rage and de-
spair of Palestinians unable to leave their
towns without enduring humiliating inter-
rogations at Israeli checkpoints, Hamas has
also provided social services not adequately
provided by the Palestinian Authority (Hass
1999; Roy 2000). The documentary film
Nahnu Jund Allah (We are God's Soldiers)
shows a Hamas social worker giving an un-
employed man food to feed his family for
weeks while also trying to help him find
work. This too is part of the Hamas story. 
In short, Hamas is indeed a fanatical, anti-
Semitic terrorist organization. But it is also a
response to a specific historical context. To
understand it, one must see it in this con-
text. The available evidence suggests that to
reduce support for militant Islamic move-
ments like Hamas, one has to dilute the de-
spair and the rage that fuel them. This is not
to say that brutal repression never succeeds
or that radical educational reform is not
needed to eradicate anti-Semitic conspiracy
theories. But as a general rule, making peo-
ple's lives unliveable is not an especially ef-
fective way to convince them to embrace
life over death and moderation over militan-
cy. 
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Youth-Culture 
i n the Middle East
The Danish Institute in Damascus is cur-
rently planning a conference on 'Youth
and Youth-Culture in the Contemporary
Middle East', scheduled for 14Ð15 Decem-
ber 2002. The goal of the conference is to
bring together a number of scholars who
have conducted research on this issue so
as to present recent research and discuss
the results presented at the conference.
The Danish Institute in Damascus is able to
cover travel expenses and accommoda-
tion for a small number of scholars who
want to present their current research. If
you are interested in presenting a paper,
please contact the institute's director, Dr
Joergen Baek Simonsen (did@scs-net.org),
giving a short introduction to your field of
research and the contents of the paper
you intend to present. 
Papers read at the conference will be
published as Vol. IV in the Proceedings of
the Danish Institute in Damascus in 2003.
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